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Abstract 
The automotive industry was one of the earliest to internationalise, with overseas production by US companies 
already happening in the early 1900s. However, the arrangement for overseas automotive production at that 
time was quite different from the idea of international production networks in the contemporary sense. There 
were few linkages between international locations and overseas operations were designed either as largely 
self-sufficient, vertically integrated, replications of their domestic factories or as CKD/SKD assembly plants 
with little local technical content. By comparison, our current understanding of international production 
networks is that they are dispersed, collaborative, high value adding and centrally coordinated. This paper 
uses global company case analysis to identify the drivers and enablers that shape the international production 
networks of two automotive companies, BMW and Volvo Cars. The methodology contrasts with previous 
network studies of the automotive industry that have concentrated their analysis at the country and regional 
level.       
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1. INTRODUCTION AND AIM OF PAPER 
 
The idea of establishing an international production 
network for automotive companies, in the sense that we 
understand today, is relatively very different from the 
concept of overseas production in the early 1900s when 
US manufacturers started to internationalise, or even the 
1950s when European companies first established 
overseas plants. The US and European companies that 
were early movers did not have many linkages between 
their international locations and they designed their 
overseas operations either as largely self-sufficient, 
vertically integrated, replications of their domestic factories 
or as CKD/SKD assembly plants with little local technical 
content. By comparison, our current understanding of 
international production networks is that they have the 
characteristics of being “dispersed”, “collaborative”, “high 
value adding” and “centrally coordinated” rather than the 
more traditional “pipeline of physical transformation” [1]. 
The aim of this paper is to undertake an empirical 
exploration of the recent developments in international 
production networks within the automotive industry. Its 
focus is on larger (but not necessarily the largest) 
automotive companies. In particular, the paper 
investigates the most significant drivers and enablers that 
shape the way international production networks today 
have been designed, or have evolved. As evidence, it uses 
data from case studies of automotive companies in which 
the drivers and enablers for their international network 
design have been identified. One is BMW, which for its 3 
brands has a network of 23 wholly owned and joint venture 
plants for parts production and car assembly, 5 “partner” 
plants for local assembly and 2 contract plants that provide 
additional capacity for producing more specialised 
vehicles.  The other is Volvo Car Corporation, which for its 
single brand has an expanding international network 
including plants jointly operated with its Chinese owner 
Zhejiang Geely. Currently this owned network comprises 8 
plants for parts production and car assembly, together with 
3 centres for design, R&D and engineering.  The paper 
addresses a research gap by considering the more 
contemporary approaches to international network design 
for production compared with earlier studies that have 
focused on more conceptual benefits of networks [2] and 
strategies underlying their configuration [3].  
 
2. INTERNATIONAL PRODUCTION IN THE 
AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY 
 
The automotive industry started to internationalise only a 
few years after the birth of the industry during the early 
1900s. In 1910 General Motors established a joint venture 
in the UK and by 1930 had added car assembly plants in 
Sweden, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, Australia, New 
Zealand, Japan, Indonesia, India and Spain. By 1929, 
Ford was assembling cars in the UK, Brazil, Argentina, 
Mexico, Sweden, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, 
Spain, Italy, Germany and Japan. Beyond the US, 
internationalisation of automotive companies was much 
slower. In the early 1900s the industry in Europe 
comprised a large number of smaller companies, so there 
was little motivation and insufficient resources for 
establishing foreign plants. Instead a number of European 
companies licensed production to newcomers elsewhere 
in the world. Large scale international production of 
European cars overseas did not start until after the 
Second World War, with Volkswagen establishing its plant 
in Brazil in 1953. In 1958 the British Austin Motor 
Company opened a plant in Australia and also during the 
1950s the Standard Motor Company opened overseas 
plants in Australia, India, South Africa and France. By the 
1960s and 1970s, internationalisation was becoming 
increasingly prevalent in the automotive industry as most 
of the main manufacturers started to open overseas 
plants. At the same time, new countries emerged as 
locations for automotive production and started to develop 
their own automotive industries. South Korea, and later 
China, became major automotive manufacturing countries 
with government strategy promoting the establishment of 
indigenous car and commercial vehicle companies.  
 
3. DRIVERS AND ENABLERS IN OPERATIONS 
STRATEGY 
 
Traditional operations strategy comprises the competitive 
priorities of the company (how it intends to position itself in 
the market related to the product and services offered), as 
well as decision categories (the decisions and capabilities 
that the company has to manage in order to comply with 
the competitive priorities). The different competitive 
priorities vary, but according to Wu and Ellis [4] the 
commonly accepted ones are quality, cost, lead time, 
delivery reliability, flexibility (which could include design 
flexibility and volume flexibility). Hayes and Wheelwright 
[5] also listed the decision categories for a factory 
manufacturing system, i.e. 
• Capacity: amount, timing, type 
• Facilities: size, location, specialisation 
• Technology: equipment, automation, linkage 
• Vertical integration: direction, extent, balance 
• Workforce: skill level, wage policies, employment 
security 
• Quality: defect prevention, monitoring, intervention 
• Production planning/material control: sourcing 
policies, centralisation, decision rules 
• Organisation structure: structure, control/reward 
system, role of staff groups 
This list of priorities and decisions becomes even more 
complex when entering manufacturing networks acting 
globally. 
 
4.  EXTENDED OPERATIONS STRATEGY IN 
INTERNATIONAL NETWORKS 
 
When applied to international production the competitive 
priorities and decision categories for factory level 
operations are also appropriate, but for the purpose of 
taking strategic network design decisions they will usually 
devolve down to second level drivers and enablers that are 
more relevant to the specific context of the company and 
its various network players (subsidiaries, partners, 
suppliers of materials and technology etc.). For example, 
the cost priority will normally have a longer time horizon 
and take account of the need to meet the demands of 
different geographical markets. And the decision category 
of vertical integration will be modified to take account of 
the dispersed nature of the network elements together with 
the way in which this impacts the conventional ideas about 
economies of scale.  
 
In addition to the decision categories for factory 
manufacturing systems, Shi and Gregory [1] have 
identified other operations strategy aspects that are 
important to consider in international networks, i.e.  
• Geographic dispersion: distributed factory condition 
• Horizontal coordination: coordinated mechanism 
• Vertical coordination: international dispersion of the 
corporate value-adding chains and their linkages 
• Dynamic response mechanism: opportunity identify, 
and manufacturing mobility 
• Product life cycle and knowledge transfer in 
international manufacturing networks 
• Operational mechanism: network daily co-ordination, 
management information system 
• Dynamic capability building and network evolution: 
learning by operations 
 
Cheng et al [6] described the development of 
manufacturing networks and how the different plants within 
a manufacturing network are interrelated. What can be 
noted from their results is that the development of the 
plants is dependent on local knowledge, access to network 
knowledge, and how well top management succeeds in 
knowledge transfer/exchange to support development. 
 
Karlsson and Sköld [7] added more organisational aspects 
on industrial networks and especially when the 
geographical distance is longer, as in international 
networks. In their study, they found that factories within a 
company group often compete with each other. None of 
the factories can be certain to get the task to produce, 
meaning that they need to be the best producer of that 
specific product. The choice is made based on different 
aspects, such as available capacity and competence, 
geographical suitability and availability of local suppliers, 
historical performance, and naturally also on cost 
performance. However, the factory that already has the 
task to industrialise a new product does, through its 
existing knowledge and capabilities, have a considerable 
advantage in this competition. The most important aspects 
of manufacturing networks and their interrelations are 
described in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: Manufacturing Network Context  
adapted from [7] 
 
5. METHODOLOGY 
 
For this paper two medium-size automotive companies 
have been selected, BMW and Volvo Car Corporation. In 
2016 the three largest automotive companies (Volkswagen 
Group, Toyota and General Motors) each produced 
around 10 million cars. By comparison, in the same year 
BMW produced nearly 2.4 million cars and Volvo Car 
produced more than 530,000 (with its parent company, 
Geely, also producing more than 765,000 cars). Most of 
the data for the cases were collected from public sources 
including company reports, press statements and articles, 
published research, Internet sources etc. Both companies 
have also been the subject of related empirical research 
investigations by the authors over many years, so 
accumulated information from plant visits and interviews 
was used to supplement the data collected from desk 
research. Simple visual text analysis of the data was used 
to identify the main drivers and enablers that have shaped 
the configurations of each case company’s international 
manufacturing network.  
Of particular importance in the analysis was to construct a 
historical timeline that identified relevant acquisitions and 
disposals in order to ascertain the extent to which network 
design has been the consequence of new influences 
within the whole company group or legacy factors from 
past decisions.  In using global company case analysis, 
the research approach contrasts with previous network 
studies of the automotive industry that have concentrated 
their analysis at the country and regional level [8], [9].     
 
6. THE CASE COMPANIES 
 
6.1 BMW company origins 
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BMW (Bayerische Motoren Werke) started in 1917 as an 
aircraft engine manufacturer based in Munich, Germany, 
but under the Versailles Treaty it had to stop producing 
military related products, so in 1922 began making small 
motorcycle engines and then complete motorcycles. Car 
production started in 1928 when BMW acquired the 
Eisenach car company and its facilities. The first model 
was a license built version of the British Austin Seven. 
During the 1930s BMW established a reputation as a 
maker of prestigious sports cars, then from 1939 to 1945 it 
built engines for the German air force and suspended car 
production. Between 1945 and 1951 some “BMW” 
branded cars were produced at the Eisenach plant, but 
this was in the Eastern Zone controlled by the Soviet 
Union so outside the jurisdiction of the West German 
authorities. Meanwhile the original BMW company 
produced motorcycles at its Munich plant until the dispute 
about its trade name was settled in 1952. By 1958 BMW 
was in financial difficulty and survived by making the Iso 
Isetta three-wheeled “bubble car”. Only after 1959 was the 
company transformed by its new owners to become the 
international brand we know today. This transformation 
started with the introduction of BMW’s New Class (Neue 
Klasse) cars during the 1960s.  
 
6.2 Establishment of BMW's international plant 
network 
 
In 1973 BMW's first overseas plant was established in 
South Africa to assemble complete cars for the local 
market from kits supplied from Germany. Then in 1979 it 
opened a dedicated engine plant in Steyr, Austria (250 km 
from Munich). By the mid-1990s BMW had 34 wholly-
owned subsidiaries. Of these 14 were in Germany and the 
other 20 were located around the world. It also had more 
than 130 foreign sales operations. BMW's manufacturing 
activities were concentrated in six plants in Germany. 
These included a motorcycle plant in Berlin and a tooling 
plant in Eisenach (after German re-unification the old 
Eisenach car plant closed). In addition, BMW operated a 
number of overseas assembly plants in partnership with 
local companies. In Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia 
local partners assembled BMW cars from kits under joint 
venture manufacturing agreements. In 1994, three new 
overseas assembly plants were established. One was in 
the Philippines and another in Vietnam to assemble cars 
from kits supplied from Germany, thereby avoiding the 
high tariffs from which were exempt by being augmented 
with locally purchased components to comply with local 
content regulations. The third plant to be established in 
1994 was in the USA. This comprehensive production 
facility at Spartanburg, South Carolina, has since proved 
to be one of the most important parts of BMW’s 
international network, being dedicated to the production of 
several models for worldwide markets. In 1994 BMW also 
acquired the Rover Group in the UK, which was sold again 
in 2000. However, three significant parts were kept, the 
new Mini model, under development since 1995, a new 
engine plant and a body shop. In 1998, twenty-five years 
after opening its first overseas plant, BMW acquired the 
UK Rolls-Royce brand (but not the manufacturing facility 
for producing Rolls-Royce cars, which was acquired by 
Volkswagen along with the Bentley brand). BMW therefore 
entirely redesigned the Rolls-Royce models using major 
parts supplied from other BMW plants and built a new 
assembly facility in the UK. 
 
 
 
6.3 Main features of BMW’s international plant network  
 
At the present time BMW has a network of 23 wholly 
owned and joint venture plants for car assembly and parts 
production, 5 “partner” plants for local assembly and 2 
contract plants that provide additional capacity for 
producing more specialised vehicles.  It also has 12 
design and R&D plants in 5 countries. The number of 
BMW employees worldwide is 124,000. There are 8 plants 
in Germany, with 4 of these assembling cars and 4 
focusing on parts and tooling production. Some of the 
assembly plants also produce parts including engines. 
One of the German plants that makes parts also 
assembles motorcycles. The plant in Austria is dedicated 
to making engines. Outside Germany there are car 
assembly plants in Brazil, India, the UK, the USA, Thailand 
(including motorcycle assembly), South Africa and Mexico 
(starting production in 2019). There are also joint venture 
plants assembling cars from kits in Russia, Egypt, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Brazil (making motorcycles). In 
the UK, there are 2 assembly plants (Mini and Rolls 
Royce), a parts plant making body components and an 
engine plant. In China, automotive companies can only 
operate with a local partner so BMW has a joint venture 
with “Brilliance Automotive” and has 2 plants in Shenyang 
producing cars, various parts and engines. All cars made 
in China by BMW are for the Chinese market only but 
exports are being considered. Currently BMW and 
Brilliance do not share any production or parts supply. 
However, they have jointly developed electric cars with a 
separate Chinese brand. In Austria and the Netherlands 
two plants assemble special variants of the BMW Mini, but 
they are independently owned.  BMW’s wider international 
network includes 12,000 external suppliers in 70 countries. 
Of these, around 100 are first tier suppliers for major parts 
such as automatic transmissions, axles, steering columns, 
brakes etc. BMW has implemented the “supplier park” 
concept for its first-tier suppliers with the first being 
opened at its Leipzig assembly plant in 2005.  
 
6.4 Volvo Car Corporation origins 
 
The Volvo trademark was first registered in 1915 by SKF, 
the Swedish machinery bearing company based in the city 
of Gothenburg, with the name deriving from the Latin verb 
“volvere”, meaning to roll. However, the company AB 
Volvo was not established until 1926 with the first car 
being produced in 1927 at a plant in Lundby, near to 
Gothenburg.  During the following 70 years Volvo grew to 
become a large international group making cars, buses, 
trucks, construction equipment, marine engines, aircraft 
engines and various ancillary products. Cars produced by 
Volvo gained a reputation for quality, reliability and 
durability, which enabled the company to build on key 
markets in Europe, North America and worldwide. By 1974 
Volvo had four car assembly plants in Sweden and several 
other plants producing automotive parts. In 1999 Ford 
Motor Company bought AB Volvo’s car division, Volvo Car 
Corporation (Volvo Personvagnar) and it became part of 
Ford’s Premier Automotive Group together with the 
existing brand of Lincoln and its other European 
acquisitions of Jaguar, Land Rover and Aston Martin. 
During the next 10 years Ford tried to build its stable of 
distinctive prestige brands and also sought to gain 
economies of scale through the use of common designs, 
parts and group purchasing. However, Ford’s strategy 
failed and drained both cash and resources at the time of 
the economic downturn. In 2010 Volvo Car was therefore 
sold to the Chinese automotive company, Zhejiang Geely 
Holding Group. Under Geely, Volvo Car started a new 
phase of its development focusing on an expansion of 
sales and manufacturing in China and the Asian region as 
well as re-establishing its reputation and building on 
existing markets.  
   
6.5 Establishment of Volvo Car’s international plant 
network 
 
In 1963 Volvo Car Corporation opened its first overseas 
plant in Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada. The purpose was to 
circumvent North American import tariffs on foreign goods 
and to capitalize on the newly signed Canadian/American 
Auto Pact. Then in 1965, the Ghent plant in Belgium was 
opened Also during the 1960s the Malaysian government 
offered incentives to foreign automotive companies in the 
form of lower duties on vehicles that were assembled 
locally from ‘kits’ of parts sent from parent factories.  
Therefore, a joint venture was formed in 1967 between 
Volvo and Federal Auto Holdings for assembly of cars at a 
new plant in Shah Alam near Kuala Lumpur.  In 1972 
Volvo bought the Dutch company DAF and for several 
years produced cars at the plant in Born. The last Volvo 
was produced at Born in 2004, although by that time the 
plant had been sold to Mitsubishi Motors. In 1998 the 
Halifax plant was closed, just before the acquisition of 
Volvo Car by Ford. In 2006 Ford started to produce Volvos 
in Chongqing, China, at its joint venture factory called 
Chang’an Ford Mazda Automotive. Since 2010, under the 
ownership of Geely, several new Volvo assembly plants 
have been established in China, although production 
under contract continued at the Ford joint venture plant in 
Chongqing until 2016. 
 
6.6 Main features of Volvo Car’s international plant 
network  
 
At the present time Volvo Car Corporation has 10 plants 
for car assembly and parts production, together with 4 
centres for design, R&D and engineering. The number of 
Volvo Car employees worldwide is 31,000. There are 3 
plants in Sweden with one of these assembling cars and 2 
focusing on parts production. The single Swedish 
assembly plant, at Torslanda near Gothenburg, has 
recently been expanded to increase capacity from 200,000 
to 300,000 cars per year. The last of the other car 
assembly plants in Sweden was closed in 2013 and 
another parts-producing plant was sold to an independent 
supplier in 2015 since only 30% of its output was for Volvo 
Car.  The plant in Belgium is the company’s second in 
Europe and has a capacity of 270,000 cars per year. A 
new plant in the USA (in Charleston, South Carolina) is 
due to start production in 2018 with initial capacity of 
100,000 cars per year. Design and R&D activity for Volvo’s 
cars is carried out in a number of centres including 
Gothenburg, California and Copenhagen in Denmark.  In 
China, Volvo Car has a joint venture with Geely (its 
owner). Since Geely’s acquisition of the Volvo two new car 
assembly plants have been built, at Chengdu in Sichuan 
Province and Daqing in Heilongjiang Province. Also, one 
other plant is under construction at Luqiao in Zhejiang 
Province. In addition, there is an engine plant at 
Zhangjiakou in Hebei Province and an engineering and 
R&D centre in Shanghai. All cars made in China by Volvo 
are for the Chinese market only but exports are proposed 
in the future. Volvo plans to make around 800,000 cars per 
year globally by 2020, with one third produced in China. 
Currently, Volvo Car and Geely do not share any 
production or parts supply. However, they have a technical 
collaboration for electric vehicles and it is also proposed to 
make a new small SUV both in Belgium and at the plant in 
Luqiao. Using common architecture there will be a Volvo 
model of this car and a Geely version sold under a new 
brand name. The wider international network of Volvo Car 
Corporation includes more than 4,000 external suppliers. 
Of these, 600 are described as “business partners 
delivering production materials for serial production”. In 
1995 Volvo Car opened a supplier park for its plant in 
Belgium and in 1998 a supplier park was opened in 
Gothenburg after halving the number of the plant’s first tier 
suppliers to 150, of which fifteen located into a new 
supplier park producing modules for headliners, seats, 
tailgates, bumpers etc.  
 
7. CASE ANALYSIS 
 
A detailed analysis of the drivers and enablers that have 
influenced the design of BMW’s and Volvo’s international 
production networks has revealed a number of themes 
that are common to both companies and other aspects 
that are unique to their particular situation. Factors that 
have determined a unique approach include markets, 
ownership and legacies from acquisitions and disposals.  
 
7.1 Drivers 
 
The drivers can be grouped according to a number of 
broad themes, i.e. environmental and safety standards (for 
passengers and pedestrians), flexibility and agility, 
leanness, ownership imperatives, legacies from mergers 
and acquisitions, technology security, currency exchange 
movements, and cross-border obstacles resulting from 
trade restrictions. Table 1 provides a summary of the main 
themes together with examples of associated key features 
at Volvo Car and BMW. It also highlights the principal 
factors that require consideration when designing or 
reconfiguring international production networks. Three key 
features have been identified under the environmental and 
safety standards theme. The first two of these relate to 
emissions control and efficiency of motor vehicle power 
units.  
 
Both Volvo Car and BMW have developed internal 
combustion engines powered with biofuels, although with 
subtle differences. Volvo’s main focus has been on the 
Swedish and European E85 (85% ethanol) standard, 
whereas BMW has focused mainly on the Latin American 
Flexfuel E100 standard that is prevalent in Brazil with its 
warmer climate. In this situation ethanol, made from local 
sugar cane, is a more feasible engine fuel when either 
used in its pure (100%) form or mixed with any amount of 
petroleum. With this aspect, markets and R&D centres are 
the principal factors to be considered. Under the same 
environmental theme both companies have also been 
developing alternative forms of propulsion, although to 
date Volvo been following mainly the hybrid engine route 
(with 20% of its X90 crossover model being hybrids),
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Table 1: Drivers and network design factors 
Theme of  
drivers 
Volvo Car 
key features 
BMW 
key features 
Network design  
factors 
Environment / safety E85 biofuel engines for 
Sweden and European 
markets 
Flexfuel E100 engines for Latin 
American markets (Brazil) 
Markets; R&D centres  
 
 Hybrid vehicles  Electric vehicles  Markets; Supply chain  
 Passive crash protection 
and collision avoidance 
Focus on active safety features Markets; Technology 
partners 
Flexibility / agility Scalable Product 
Architecture (SPA) 
Mixed model assembly plants Supply chain 
Leanness Limited options offered Build to Order Markets;  
Suppliers (supplier parks) 
Ownership  Various changes in 
ownership  
No ownership change 
(acquisitions only) 
Owner influence 
Legacies from mergers 
and acquisitions 
Legacy of Volvo Group  
and Ford  
Legacies from Rover  Plants; Suppliers 
Technology security Transfer risks through 
ownership and possible 
competing brands 
Transfer risk through partnership 
requiring control of IPR 
Nature of partnerships; 
Workforce mobility 
Currency exchange Expanding outside Europe 
but exposure to CNY risk 
Multiple locations to minimise 
exchange rate risk  
Dispersed networks 
Cross border obstacles Mainly limited to EU trade 
agreements 
Production in EU, NAFTA,  
Mercosur and ASEAN 
Tariff restrictions; non-
tariff barriers  
 
whereas BMW has placed more attention on the 
development of electric vehicles (with the BMW i3 
becoming the best-selling electric car in Europe during 
2016).  With this aspect, the principal network design 
factors are markets and supply chains for engines and 
transmissions. Also within this theme there are some 
differences in the way the two automotive companies have 
addressed the question of passenger and pedestrian 
safety. Volvo Car has traditionally focused on passive 
crash protection and more recently on collision avoidance 
in accordance with its well-known market strategy of 
making safety a priority. BMW on the other hand has a 
market strategy based on driving performance, which is 
reflected in its focus on building active safety features into 
its cars. With this aspect, markets and technology partners 
are the principal network design factors.   Compared with 
more traditional factory level priorities the flexibility and 
agility theme within the international production networks 
of both companies focuses mainly on design rather than 
volume flexibility. Volvo Car has recently developed a 
concept known as Scalable Product Architecture (SPA) to 
enable greater model range and variety based on common 
modules. BMW on the other hand has placed its focus on 
mixed model production systems at its international plants 
to enable a wide range of offerings in local markets. This 
aspect places greatest emphasis on the supply chain and 
its capability as the principal network design factor. Since 
the early 1990s lean production concepts have become 
well embedded in most automotive companies. However, 
at Volvo Car and BMW there are some differences in 
implementation that impact on international network 
design. These partly result from the relative market size 
and sales strategy of each company. Volvo Car offers a 
comparatively limited range of options for its models and 
provides a large number of features as standard, thereby 
enabling leanness in a system for building to stock.  BMW 
on the other hand has developed a build-to-order system, 
which to enable lean production means having greater 
coordination within the supply chain. For both companies 
this aspect places markets, suppliers (and supplier parks) 
at the centre of their network design thinking. The theme 
of ownership, together with legacies from mergers and 
acquisitions, has a profound impact on international 
production networks. In some respects, this aspect is 
outside the control of network designers, although in other 
cases an acquiring firm may be influenced by the existing 
network of an acquisition target. The situation of Volvo Car 
has mainly been as an acquired company, with its past 
acquisition of DAF being made by the Volvo Group and 
having only short-term impact on its car division. 
Nevertheless, its acquirers (Ford, and more recently 
Geely) have still imposed considerable influence on how 
its networks have evolved. By contrast, BMW has made a 
small number of important acquisitions that have 
influenced both its model range and also the network of 
production facilities used to support all its manufacturing 
activities (at its own plants and also its suppliers).  
 
The last three themes in Table 1 are all consequent on 
cross border considerations and the impact they have on 
international production networks. Technology security is 
of particular concern for retaining competitive advantage 
and both companies are exposed to risk through their 
international ownership structure and partnerships. 
Workforce mobility into and out of the international 
network is also an important design factor within this 
aspect, so requires careful management control. Currency 
exchange represents another theme with both 
opportunities and risks. Due to its larger size, BMW has 
been able to manage this aspect more effectively by 
operating in multiple locations, with its plants in the USA 
and Latin America being operated partly as a measure to 
hedge against currency variations as well as providing 
greater cost security when selling to local markets. 
Outside Sweden, Volvo Car by contrast has traditionally 
focused production and sales within Europe and more 
recently the “Eurozone” common European currency area, 
although the more recent expansion of its network into 
China has created some currency risk regarding the 
Chinese Renminbi Yuan (CNY). Only in 2015 did it start 
construction of a new manufacturing plant in North 
America after closing the Canadian facility almost 20 years 
previously. The final theme in Table 1 relates mainly to 
financial tariffs and other cross border non-tariff barriers 
such as country product standards and cabotage 
restrictions. The move towards free trade agreements and 
single markets has provided some mitigation with Volvo 
Car traditionally benefiting mainly from the EU single 
market and to a lesser extent the South East Asian 
(ASEAN) free trade agreement, while BMW has also more 
recently taken advantage of the free trade agreements in 
North America (NAFTA) and Latin America (Mercosur) as 
well as ASEAN.   
 
7.2 Enablers 
 
To enable smooth operations of their international 
production networks, both companies make extensive use 
of ICT solutions for information sharing and control. BMW 
has developed a “Partner Portal” as its interface and 
communication platform for the whole BMW group and its 
various partners. It also has a “Business Network Portal” 
for employees and partners to access the company’s 
business services and electronic mail systems. The 
equivalent Volvo Cars “Supplier Portal” provides 
information and communications for suppliers regarding 
purchasing conditions, payment procedures, quality and 
sustainability. Supply of parts to the international 
production network is also simplified by reducing the 
number of first tier suppliers and making extensive use of 
product modules. Both BMW and Volvo Car have internal 
component manufacturing facilities or dedicated third party 
delivery of complete sub-assemblies from supplier parks 
(such as cockpit and dashboard modules, seating units, 
automatic transmissions etc.).  Their role is important to 
network design and control. Of similar importance is the 
role of specialised shippers and providers of third party 
logistics solutions for materials. For its plant in Brazil the 
port of Paranaguá is uniquely equipped for handing 
specialised RoRo vehicle carriers with movable decks, 
while similarly the port of Gent has been upgraded and 
equipped for shipping the Belgian production of Volvo 
Cars. Efficient technology transfer from the parent 
company to subsidiaries and partners has become a vital 
aspect of international production networks and, as 
mentioned earlier, technology security has become an 
important consideration for this enabler. In the same way, 
international skills mobility is an enabler but carries risk of 
knowledge misappropriation as personnel move within 
networks, and especially when interacting outside the 
network.        
 
8. DISCUSSION  
 
The purpose of this empirical study has been to explore 
recent developments in international production networks 
with a view to identifying and assessing the main drivers 
and enablers in two medium size automotive companies 
that both target the same customer segment, i.e. the 
premium market. It finds that network design has moved 
beyond the traditional “keiretsu” supply arrangements of 
Japanese automotive companies, which were typically 
associated with the lean production concept represent in 
an earlier, narrower model of manufacturing networks. 
These early types of plant arrangements proved incapable 
of achieving the need for speed of change, flexibility and 
cost cutting that was demanded from the late 1990s and 
were also more suited to plant networks that were largely 
distributed domestically rather than internationally [10], 
[11].  
 
9. CONCLUSION  
 
The current study has found that the principal imperatives 
of cost reduction and quality improvement are now 
achieved mainly through actions within the company’s own 
network elements rather than externally through pressure 
on the supplier network. Among the drivers that have been 
identified for networks today are several that are less 
closely related to the priorities of quality, cost, lead time, 
delivery reliability, and volume flexibility, which are now 
regarded as norms, so therefore taken as read, and thus 
implicitly built-in as essential attributes of the core network 
structure, while newer priorities drive the design of more 
contemporary networks. 
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